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Abstract 
The paper focused on the analysis of the influence of fiscal 
decentralization (FD) on the performance of County governments in Kenya 
during the transitionary period from a central to a decentralised governance 
system (2013-2018). The quest for fiscal decentralisation has taken center 
stage in the past three decades in many parts of the word including Latin 
America, Asian countries, Africa and throughout the formally planned 
economies. The study was prompted by conflicting findings from previous 
empirical studies in both developed and the developing countries. Three 
indicators of fiscal decentralisation were defined and used in the study. These 
are the ratio of county governments' funds received from the National 
Government and local revenue collections. The other is transfer grants, 
defined as both conditional and unconditional funds received from both 
national government and development partners. Multiple regression analysis 
and correlation analysis were used to estimate the parameters of the model. 
The study was descriptive and used panel data to offer a comprehensive profile 
of the key variables identified in the conceptual framework. The unit of 
analysis was the County government with all the 47 counties forming the 
population of study. The results reveal that 27.43% of variations in the 
performance of County Governments are explained by the variables in the 
model and that equitable share (UB) has the most significant influence. From 
the several tests applied, the prediction model was confirmed as appropriate. 
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Introduction 
Fiscal Decentralisation (FD) refers to the transfer of public finance 
decisions from the central government to Subnational Governments (SNGs) 
at lower levels (Luiz & Barenstein, 2001). It is about the question of how 
governments at lower levels raises their resources to meet their expenditure 
needs. Salami (2011) posits that once a choice on the governance system has 
been made, it affects public finance orientation, political governance, and 
economic wellbeing alongside the achievement of social stability. Kenya 
promulgated a modern Constitution in the year 2010 and it did away with the 
colonial constitution which had been found wanting. The latter constitution 
ushered in a devolved system of governance and drastically transformed the 
public finance architecture which became effective in 2013. 
During the course of the transitionary period spanning from 2013-
2018, the management and sustainability of public finance affairs was clearly 
thrust to the domain of County Governments (CGs) for the first time in the 
history of the country with great expectations of making enormous impact on 
the well-being of residents. Shortly after, these SNGs faced delayed and 
insufficient transfers from the National government (NG) resulting in 
underperformance in meeting the expectations of their residents. However, the 
increasing pressure on public financial requirements is not extraordinary but 
only became more pronounced owing to a slowdown of overall economic 
growth, increased unemployment and heightened political activity in the 
country. 
The National Treasury (2017) recognizes the need for fiscal 
consolidation and fiscal reforms targeting enhanced capacity for revenue 
collections and public sectors’ productivity and efficiency at the SNG level to 
improve their fiscal positions. To ensure both the devolved and locally 
collected funds are utilized efficiently, the constitution (2010) compels 
observance of the principle of openness and transparency in resource 
allocation. In the initial years of transition, fiscal imbalances quickly emerged 
as expectations soured and local revenues decreased. This was exacerbated by 
expenditure reduction on public goods due to institutional and structural 
malfunctioning, particularly the revenue transmission system commonly 
known as the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS).  
The Controller of Budget (2017) attributes the lackluster performance to lack 
of capacity to prepare realistic revenue projections as well as detailed revenue 
forecasts as required by the law (PFMA, 2012). Inefficiency in performance 
by County governments points to potential for improvement by fully 
maximizing on all input costs. Hence the objective of this paper: to assess the 
effect of fiscal decentralisation on performance of County governments in 
Kenya. Since the devolved system that created the subnational governments 
was new, barely any literature existed linking fiscal decentralisation and 
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performance of county governments in Kenya. Performance analysis provides 
systematic comparative measurement approaches of outcomes between 
County Governments making it possible to identify areas that can be improved 
(Nieswand & Seifer, 2011). The analysis provides for benchmarking that 
identify best practices. The purpose of these analyses is also to explain the 
performance differences and inefficiencies that are due to exogenous factors: 
determinants that are not fully under the control of DMUs; like population 
size, land area and equitable share. A clearer understanding of the nature of 
performance is important for designing policies that improve resource 
allocation and influences socio-economic growth. 
Using a panel data set of 2013-2018 financial years, this study 
evaluates the relationship between public expenditure management and the 
expected outcomes of the 47 County governments in Kenya using a wellbeing 
index measurement model. The study examines and discusses the parameters 
that may explain the reasons for inefficiency and also assesses the indicators 
of the outcomes by use of multiple regression analysis. 
Two key issues emphasized in multilayered systems to ensure fiscal 
sustainability and public sector performance are allocation of responsibilities 
and the management of public spending (OECD, 2003). According to Oates 
(2005), decision-making responsibility is preferable where people live, work, 
play and die. This argument is in line with public choice theory as postulated 
by Balaguer-Coll, Prior, Tortosa-Ausina, (2010). However, according to 
Zhang and Zhou (1998), it does not hold true that the more decentralised a 
country’s fiscal systems become, the faster its rate of economic development. 
Indeed Nzau (2014) found that both decentralised capital finance and 
decentralised recurrent finance contributed negatively to economic growth in 
Kenya.  
The second section provides a history of theoretical and empirical 
reviews of trends in fiscal decentralisation and also formalizes the conceptual 
framework that analyses the effect of independent variables on the dependent 
variable. The third section discusses the relevant data and methodology 
employed in data collection as well as measurement approaches. The key 
variables are also identified and described. The fourth section discusses the 
theoretical and empirical implications of fiscal decentralisation on the 
performance of subnational governments with respect to the study context-
Kenya. The fifth section discusses and presents the findings of the study by 
use of both descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis that makes 
use of panel datasets to test the hypothesis. The final section of this paper 
presents the limitations and conclusions of the study as well as suggestions for 
further research directions.  
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Theoretical foundations and empirical reviews:  
The fiscal federalism theory as postulated by Musgrave (1959, 1989) 
and Oates (1972) is reviewed herein. Oates (1972) Decentralisation Theorem 
stipulates that some goods and services are uniquely suited for specific regions 
and not others due to differences in tastes, preferences as well as natural 
endowments. Decentralisation per se refers to the transfer of expenditure and 
taxation decision-making powers from central governments to lower levels of 
government (Luiz & Barenstein, 2001). While decentralisation can take a 
variety of forms such as administrative, political, economic and fiscal (Steiner, 
2006), it is the latter that this paper focuses on which entails the means and 
mechanisms of fiscal co-operation in sharing public revenues at all levels of 
government (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). Fiscal decentralisation is a portion 
of reform package for improving public sector fiscal systems to enhance 
efficiency, raise competition among lower level governments in the delivery 
of public goods leading to accelerated economic development (Bird & 
Wallick, 1993).  
The use of ‘budget data’ obtainable from national governments as 
centrally compiled by International Monetary Fund statistics as well as 
equitable shares to sub-national governments (SNGs) combines local revenue 
sources to serve as indicators of fiscal decentralisation (Bodman, 2008). The 
Kenyan constitution (2010) requires not less than 15% of all revenues 
collected nationally to be transferred to SNGs commonly called County 
governments. More resources are mobilized as equalization funds and local 
charges and taxation. Drawing on the “Musgravian model” of public sector 
governmental functions of allocation, stabilization and distribution, Musgrave 
(1959) anchored the logic of the theory on the principle of subsidiarity. The 
objective is to focus the role of government to improving the wellbeing of 
individuals and households at the lowest practicable levels. 
Smoke (2001) advances several reasons why the three ‘Musgravian’ 
functions are assigned to National government: first, he noted the challenge of 
SNGs having total independence of control of resources which could threaten 
the existence of the unitary government. Secondly, he noted local economy’s 
fragile need for externalities/spillover effects and economies of scope. 
Thirdly, the author underscored the need for deficit financing from 
creditors/lenders beyond local borders, noting that some types of revenue 
sources considered most apt for local governments tend to be income-inelastic, 
hence constraining the ability of CG from pursuing development programs 
effectively. 
Given that previous empirical studies indicate mixed results, the 
analytical framework of this paper is built on existing models with 
modifications to suit the study context. After the tumultuous changes 
occasioned by the promulgation of a modern constitution in Kenya in 2010, 
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there was need to empirically analyze the impact of fiscal decentralisation on 
performance of the devolved units of government commonly known as county 
governments. The predictor-criterion model employed is as shown below: 
Y= αo + β 1UB + β 2LR + β 3TG + εi ……………………….…………..2.1 
 
Where Y is the dependent variable (County Performance), UB is the equitable 
revenue from the national government, LR is the local revenue collection and 
TG is the conditional and unconditional transfer grants from national 
government and other development partners. αo is the regression constant and 
β1-β3 are the regression coefficients while ε is the random error term.  
The framework of variable operationalization is presented in figure 1 
below. 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
Data and Methodology: 
Using a panel data set of the period 2013-2018 financial years, this 
article assesses the performance of the 47 County governments in Kenya using 
an OLS regression model. The study used a data collection form to gather data 
and information from various institutions such as the National Treasury, 
Office of the Auditor General, Office of the Controller of Budget, Commission 
on Revenue Allocation, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), Kenya 
Institute of Public Policy and Research Analysis among others. The study 
examines and discusses the parameters that may explain the reasons for 
performance and also assesses the indicators of the outcomes by use of 
multiple regression and County wellbeing reports (2006, 2016). 
There exists a broad category of measurement approaches called basic 
needs accounts or capability accounts of wellbeing, but one of the most well-
known approach is the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) which 
identifies the concept of wellbeing as resting upon three factors: income levels 
and distribution, education levels and health standards. With panel data from 
all the 47 counties, the researcher used a common class of poverty measures 
formula as advanced by Ravallion (1998), Sen, Stiglitz, and Fitoussi, (2009) 
to compute the index of each County. The poverty line is a threshold applied 
for separating the poor and the non-poor and in this study, it was derived based 
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on the cost of basic needs (CBN) approach for a basic basket of goods and 
services consumed by households using the method adopted by Ravallion 
(1998). Those above the poverty line are deemed to enjoy a high state of 
wellbeing as a group or region at a given place and time. The poverty measure, 
Pi is defined as: 
 
Where:  
N is the population size,  
Yi is the level of individual welfare or real per capita consumption of the ith 
individual, 
ᵶ is the poverty line, 
I is an indicator function that maps the value of one, and zero otherwise. 
Wellbeing ratio is defined as:  
Wr = (1 – Pi) 
which should be understood in terms of citizens real opportunities that give all 
possible combinations of functioning from which they can make choices (Sen, 
Stiglitz, & Fitoussi, 2009). The poverty headcount index refers to the number 
of individuals whose consumption expenditure is below the poverty line as a 
percentage of total population in the County. It reflects the share of the 
population who cannot afford to purchase the basic basket of food and non-
food items (KNBS, 2016). This income and expenditure measure is the most 
commonly used metric in practice for comparison of wellbeing and living 
standards of individuals and regions. These indicators are sumarised as shown 
in table 1 below. 
Table 1: Measurement and operationalization of variables 
Variable Indicators Operational 
Definitions 
Country level 
variables 
Data Sources 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
 
Fiscal 
Decentraliz
ation (FD) 
 
 
1. Equita
ble Share 
 
 
2. Amount 
transferred from 
National to 
County level 
Total National 
Budget 
 
 
Smoke, P (2001)  
Wallis and Oates 
(1988) 
 
 
3. Local 
revenue 
Collection 
 
 
 Amount of Local 
Revenue 
Collection 
 
 
National Tax 
Revenue 
 
 
Luiz& Barrenstein 
(2001)  
Tiebout, C (1956) 
 
4. Conditi
onal/Uncondi
tional Grants 
 
5. Other 
funds from 
National 
Government, and 
External funds 
from 
donor/developme
nt partners 
Constitution of 
Kenya (2010) 
Oates, W.E 
(1972) 
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development 
partners 
Independe
nt  
Variable 
 
Performanc
e of 
County 
Governme
nts (Wr) 
 Per capita 
income (PCI) 
 Well-being 
index 
 Human 
development 
index (HDI) 
 Poverty 
Levels (PI) 
Standards of living, 
health, literacy, 
employment, 
consumption per 
capita and general 
state of wellbeing 
GDP per capita 
Rate of GDP 
growth 
National Poverty 
Index 
Republic of 
Kenya (2012) 
KNBS (2016) 
National Treasury 
(2017) 
Sen, Stiglitz, & 
Fitoussi,  (2009) 
Ravallion (1998) 
 
Source: Author (2019) 
 
The characterization of well-being postulates a utility function defined 
over consumption of commodities such that the function produces consumer 
preferences over alternative consumption bundles (Ravallion, 1998). Hence 
the poverty line can be interpreted as the point when the consumers 
expenditure gives the minimum cost to the household or region of attaining a 
given level of utility at the prevailing market prices. Balassa-Samuelson model 
(Asea & Mendoza, 1994) holds that there is a positive association between 
expenditures, development and performance as measured by HDI. A relative 
poverty line rises with average expenditure which is proportional to the mean 
and median income of the population.  
In majority of the studies, financial inputs are mainly used rather than 
physical data. Some authors use one financial aggregate to describe the total 
inputs while others decompose them into transfers from central government 
and locally collected finances (Wallis & Oates, 1988). The advantage of using 
financial data is that all inputs are comparable and it also implies that DMUs 
face identical factor prices, and quantities cannot accordingly be wrongly 
implemented in the estimation (Nieswand & Seifer, 2011). The total 
expenditures including equitable share, local revenue collection and 
conditional grants were used as single and combined inputs employed by 
County governments to provide the goods and services assigned to them. 
Using total expenditures as input measure allows the incorporation of all 
relevant input information on the one hand while also implicitly assuming that 
input factor prices are the same for all subnational governments for purposes 
of comparing performance.  
On the other hand of outputs, analysis predominantly rely on the tasks that 
are obligatory to the units’ devolved functions. This approach covers the vast 
majority of costs/expenditures and allows for comparison of performance. To 
measure these output indicators, literature provides a wide range of means 
including education literacy, life expectancy, mortality rates, unemployment 
rates, consumption per capita, well-being levels, inequality index, human 
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development index (HDI) as citizens are more concerned about the final 
outcomes/impact rather than the amount of services delivered (Afonso & 
Fernandes, 2006). 
Representing the production process of DMUs is complex and difficult to 
model as wellbeing measurement goes beyond objective reports to include 
subjective reports and perceptions of the extent of citizens “opportunity set” 
and their capacity and freedom to choose among these opportunities the life 
they value (Balaguer-Coll, Prior, Tortosa-Ausina, 2007).  
The second stage of analysis used multiple regression model in terms of 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in order to establish the strength of the 
independent variable (Fiscal Decentralisation) on the dependent variable 
(County government performance). The predictor-criterion variables were 
modelled in the form of the equation defined in section 2 above. 
The analysis was undertaken by use of explanatory factors through 
regression on performance scores obtained earlier in accordance with 
Ravallion (1998), Sen, Stiglitz, and Fitoussi, (2009) and KNBS (2016) to 
assess the respective power of each indicator on the criterion. The purpose of 
these analyses is also to explain the performance differences of each county 
that are due to exogenous factors such as determinants that are not fully under 
the control of DMUs like population size, land area and equitable share. A 
clearer understanding of the nature of performance levels is important for 
designing policies that improve resource allocation. 
 
Fiscal Decentralisation and Performance of County Governments: 
Fiscal Decentralisation is one of the four commonly used dimensions 
of decentralisation while the others are political, administrative and economic 
or market liberalization. Fiscal decentralisation implies existence of multi-
layered levels of government each with different expenditure functions and 
responsibilities as well as taxation powers (Luiz & Bareinstein, 2001). It 
implies that power on expenditure and revenue raising decisions, previously 
the preserve of national government is systematically and legally transferred 
to lower levels of government. The mode of transfer from national government 
to local government can take different styles and this paper identifies them to 
include deconcentration, delegation and devolution. Fiscal decentralisation 
has become an established policy of many developing as well as the developed 
countries and is actively promoted as a development strategy by organizations 
like IMF and World Bank (Azfar O. Meagher, P. Lanyi, A. Kakhomen, S & 
Diana, R., 2000). 
Crucial areas of concern regarding fiscal decentralisation and its 
impact on economic development are intergovernmental transfer relations, 
assignment of expenditure responsibilities, territorial jurisdictions, taxation 
powers and forms of taxes and resource allocation mechanisms (Musgrave, 
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1959 and Oates, 1972). These issues form the foundation for protracted 
discussions, debate, and analyses around the world with different authors and 
researchers emphasizing on different aspects depending on their context 
(Baranky & Lockwood, 2006). Literature provides a wide coverage of 
empirical studies on the relationships between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic performance ranging from single, mixed to cross-country studies 
all-encompassing developing countries, the developed world and OECDs; all 
of which yield very different results. 
While national governments are in a better position to play the role of 
stabilization especially in light of changes in the international macroeconomic 
environment (Musgrave, 1989), the fiscal federalism theory also places the 
principal responsibility for distribution with the central government (Oates, 
1972). This duty and its redistributive functions depend invariably on the 
existing mobility of both resources and individuals. The national government 
is in a position to redistribute resources from wealthier to poorer jurisdiction 
through apt taxation measures (Hyman, 2005).  
Though there have been challenges to the conventional 
recommendation that distribution be centralized, local governments tend to 
have access to revenue sources that are not easily levied in a manner that is 
progressive with respect to income (Abachi & Salamu, 2012).  
The allocation function considers preference-matching and welfare 
gains of residents in the absence of market and competitive pricing 
mechanisms, for public service goods (Taylor, 1993). Community-wide 
demands through stakeholders and public participation, articulated through 
collective-decision making process is taken to reflect value for money for 
identified priorities (Tiebout, 1956). Hence fiscal decentralisation is desirable 
not just because of preference differentiation but also because expenditure 
decisions are tied more to taxation measures within local jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, where there are larger numbers of subnational governments, 
there’s likely to be greater competition and greater experimentation and 
innovation in the provision of goods leading to enhanced performance and 
productivity (Adan, C., Matsushima, Y., Hernandez-Sierra, R., Marco-
Ferreres, R., Fernandez-Moreno, M.A., Gonzalez-Vioque, E., Calleja, M., 
Aragon, J.J., Kaguni, L.S., Garesse, R. 2008).  
These devolved governments lead to enhanced performance in the 
management of economic resources as the decentralised systems are more 
transparent in defining the role of various public agents and place a greater 
premium on accountability for results (Huther & Shah, 1998). In this sense, 
provision of resources at the decentralised level in contrast to the monopolistic 
position of central governments that presumes ‘one-size-fits-all’ leads to faster 
redress of the challenges of poverty, inequality, illiteracy, poor health, 
insecurity and lack of skills that prevents individuals from realizing their full 
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potential (Tiebout, 1956). However, there are certain exceptions to this general 
rule of decentralisation when it comes to capital intensive goods such as 
transportation, electricity connectivity which are more amenable to economies 
of scope in production. In such cases, resource allocation is more efficient 
when service provision area is drawn such that externalities are internalized 
(Leibenstein, 1966). 
Since gaining independence in 1963, Kenya has grappled with various 
types of decentralisation which have oscillated from delegation to the more 
comprehensive constitutional form of devolution in 2010. Mwenda (2010) 
opines that the current constitution brought in dramatic changes in how the 
country is governed with its primary objective being to promote democratic 
and accountable exercise of power, foster national unity, confer power of self-
governance and engagement to local communities and promote social and 
economic development. The key drivers of clamor for devolution in Kenya 
were corruption, wastage and unequal distribution of public resources which 
was a clear recipe for political instability (Ndii, 2010). 
The devolution process that took effect in 2013 began transferring at 
least 15% of National Governments revenue to the 47 devolved government 
units for use in their various development activities (CoK, 2010). The amount 
is shared among all the Counties on a set criterion that regards population size, 
poverty levels as well as the physical landmass of the Counties. Similarly, the 
county governments mobilize their own revenues from local sources to 
supplement the transfers from the national government. The national 
government also continues with intergovernmental transfers of grants and 
other conditional funds to undertake nationally identified projects and 
programs within the Counties (Kirira, 2011).  
Fiscal decentralisation is expected to deliver equity in resource sharing and 
has a known positive influence on governance and government quality (Huther 
and Shah, 1998). To ensure both devolved and locally collected funds are 
utilized efficiently to achieve maximum impact in the well-being of residents, 
the Kenyan Constitution (2010) compels County governments to observe the 
principle of openness and transparency and additionally requires them to 
absorb as much of the available funds as practically possible. 
 
Analysis and Presentation of Results: 
The following section is a discussion report for the articles’ main 
objective- which was to assess how fiscal decentralisation affected the 
performance of County governments in Kenya between 2013 and 2018. The 
paper hypothesized that the effect of fiscal decentralisation on performance of 
County governments in Kenya was not significant.  
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Descriptive statistics 
A preliminary analysis of descriptive statistics was done to enable 
presentation of data in a simpler manner for ease of interpretation. The analysis was 
to establish the measures of central tendency, the standard deviation as well as 
normality. The test for normality was done by use of Shapiro-Wilks which indicated 
normality of distribution of the variables. The results are shown in table 2 below:  
Table 2: Summary of descriptive statistics 
Variable UB LR TG Wr 
Mean 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Std deviation 
Skewness 
Kutorsis 
Shapiro – 
Wilks 
5.527 
14.045 
2.052 
2.073 
1.749 
3.399 
0.904 
0.682 
11.71 
0.027 
0.161 
5.553 
32.799 
0.351 
8.879 
51.63 
1.598 
7.857 
2.262 
5.733 
0.917 
0.509 
0.782 
0.125 
0.164 
-0.636 
-0.279 
0.959 
Observation 235 235 235 235 
Source: Author (2019) 
 
Diagnostic Tests  
Prior to proceeding with the analysis, the data collected was subjected 
to rigorous diagnostic tests in order to verify and validate its suitability.  
 
Multicollinearity  
As highlighted by Piana, Cardoso, Dias, Gomes, Agostinho and 
Miranda (2017), multicollinearity tests are crucial especially in order to check 
whether the predictors in a regression model are themselves correlated. 
Accordingly, the test was conducted on the three variables under fiscal 
decentralization namely equitable allocation from the national government, 
local revenue collections by the County government as well as conditional and 
unconditional grants given to the counties. This was done by use of variance 
inflation factors (VIF) which according to DeForest, Brix, Tear and Adams 
(2018) is a measure of the extent to which the residues in a multivariate linear 
regression is inflated by its correlation with other concepts in the model. It’s a 
phenomenon where a predictor variable in a multiple regression model can 
also be linearly predicted and inferred from the others. 
Table 3: Results of multicollinearity tests 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Equitable Share (UB) 6.56 0.152360 
Local Revenue (LR) 1.68 0.593864 
Transfer Grants (TG) 1.20 0.834365 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
As indicated in table 3 above, since all the values of variance inflation 
factors were below 10, it can be confirmed that indeed they are not significant 
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in the correlations among the independent variables which were used in the 
model namely equitable share from the national government, conditional and 
unconditional grants as well as local revenue collected by the County 
governments (Deforest Brix, Tear and Adams, 2018). 
 
Unit Root Tests 
A unit root is a feature of random probability distribution process 
involving time series models that can occasion challenges in statistical 
inference. It is a trend in a time series that displays a systematic pattern that is 
unpredictable. Existence of a unit root can cause serious issues in statistical 
analysis like spurious regression or errant behavior of results (Long, Sun, 
Cheng & Zhang, 2017). A unit root is one of the causes of non-stationarity. In 
this study, a test for existence of unit root was conducted by use of Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) technique which tests the null hypothesis that a unit root 
exists in a time series data set. 
Table 4: Unit Root Test 
Variable ADF Test P-Value (95 % confidence interval) Remarks 
WI -0.208 0.05 Stationary 
UB -0.531 0.02 Stationary 
LR -0.532 0.00 Stationary 
TG -5.941 0.04 Stationary 
Source: Author 2018 
 
The findings summarized in the table 4 above reveal that all the three 
variables for the 235 observations yielded p-values that were less than the 0.05 
level of significance implying that they all met the required condition of 
stationarity. 
 
Heteroscedasticity Tests 
This is yet another critical test in most of econometric and statistical 
analysis. Adamec (2017) highlights that the test is used to check for the 
presence of various patterns of non-constant variances in the linear model. The 
presence of heteroscedasticity in the application of regression analysis is of 
great of concern as it can invalidate or bias the significance of statistical tests. 
The research used Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test. For the model to hold 
the variance of residues should be constant otherwise they would be referred 
to as being heteroscedastic. 
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Table 5: Results of tests for heteroscedasticity  
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
 Ho: The residuals of the regression are homoscedastic. 
 Variables: fitted values for wellbeing 2016 
 chi2(1) = 0.67 
 Prob > chi2 = 0.4119 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
Table 5 above provides results for test of heteroscedasticity which was 
carried out on the basis of the null hypothesis that indeed the residuals of the 
regression are constant in the given set of data. As clearly summarized in the 
table above, the value of the test statistic which is the chi-square equals to 
0.67, which furthermore has a p-value of 0.4119 which is above 0.05. This 
leads to failure to reject the null hypotheses (HO), in other words there is 
constant variance in the datasets or the data is homoscedastic. 
 
Autocorrelation Tests  
In order to check for autocorrelation, the study employed the Durbin 
Watson test statistic which is used to test for first order serial correlation. This 
is a measure of correlation between the errors of a series and others from the 
same series and can be positive or negative (DeForest Brix, Tear and Adams, 
2018). The study hypothesized a null hypothesis that there does not exist a 
first order autocorrelation from the regression analysis. The test proceeded to 
examine if serial residuals are autocorrelated at a P-value of 0.05. 
Table 6 below provides the results for autocorrelation tests on the residuals.  
Table 6: Autocorrelation tests on residuals 
Durbin-Watson d-statistic (4, 235) = 1.9032 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
Since the calculated value of the test statistic for this study was 1.9, it 
can be said that indeed there was no statistically significant serial correlation 
between the residuals of the regression model based on the equitable share 
from the national government, conditional and unconditional grants as well as 
local revenue collected by the national government as the independent 
variables. Hence independence of the residuals is maintained. 
 
Cointegration tests 
In empirical statistics, it is common and important to fit vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models as a preliminary step in order to estimate 
Impulse responses. The purpose is to make sure that the right number of lags 
are selected for the fitted model in order to come up with an optimal lag length 
among multiple time series data. Each variable is considered a linear function 
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of past lags of the other variables. The analysis was undertaken by making a 
null hypothesis that there is no cointegration amongst the variables. The study 
used the Johansen methodology which makes use of the Maximum Likelihood 
(ML) estimator of the parameters. The study results are in table 7 below. 
Table 7: Cointegration results 
  Johansen Tests for 
Cointegration 
  
Trend: constant     
Number of 
obs = 235 
Sample: 2013-
2017 
    Lags =2 
Maximum   Trace 5% critical 
Rank Parms LL Eigen Value Statistic value 
0 6 -399.923 . 19.2203 14.34 
1 9 -391.382 0.36976 1.1495* 3.76 
2 10 -390.807 0.03059         
       
Source: Author (2019) 
After determining that there was indeed a long run relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and performance of county governments, a 
vector error correction (VEC) was conducted and the results are summarised 
in table 8 below. 
Table 8: Vector Error Correction Model 
D_Wellbeing 
Index 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
L1. 1 0.056163 0.58 0.561 
-
0.0774558 
0.142699 
_cons 0.598432 38.98808 0.02 0.988 -75.8168 77.01367 
D_UB       
L1. 0.009822 0.003804 2.58 0.01 0.0023678 0.017277 
_cons -1.14739 2.640344 -0.43 0.664 -6.322367 4.02759 
D_LR       
L1. 0.00662 0.001461 4.53 0 0.0037564 0.009484 
_cons -1.39429 1.014375 -1.37 0.169 -3.382425 0.593852 
D_TG       
L1. 0.000411 0.001347 0.31 0.76 -0.002228 0.003051 
_cons 2.379055 0.934838 2.54 0.011 0.5468055 4.211304 
Source: Author (2019) 
 
The study findings indicate that the three components of fiscal 
decentralisation had a positive relationship with their first lags and that the 
relationship of lags between equitable share and local revenue collections had 
a statistically significant relationship with their first lags. 
The variables of the regression model were then tested and coefficients of 
the equation computed as shown below: 
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Table 9: Model Summary and ANOVA Table 
Source SS Df MS Number of obs = 235 
    F(3,231) = 30.48 
Model 1.79443444 3 0.598144814 Prob > F = 0.000 
Residual 4.53327965 231 0.019624587 R-squared = 0.2836 
    
Adj R-squared = 
0.2743 
Total 6.32771409 234 0.027041513 Root MSE = 0.14009 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
Table 10: Coefficients for the Regression Model 
Wellbeing 
Index 
Coef. Std. Err. T P>|t| 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
 
UB 38.16894 6.048397 6.31 0.000 26.25187 50.08602 
LR 0.0697662 0.007325 9.53 0.000 0.0553348 0.0841975 
TG 0.0001425 0.001275 0.11 0.911 -0.0023695 0.0026545 
_cons 0.6717895 0.030021 22.38 0.000 0.612639 0.73094 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
It was observed from table 9 that the explained variation of the 
dependent variable equaled 27.43% which is interpreted to have been caused 
by variations in the independent variables. The balance 72.57% is assumed to 
be due to other unexplained factors. Taking the significance level of 95%, the 
value of the F-ratio (F=30.48) had a P-value = .000 which was less than the 
level of significance (0.05). This means that the ratio of variations caused by 
the model and the residual is statistically significant. This therefore implies 
that regression model adopted is suitable for the prediction of the various 
relationships. 
Table 10 above which depicts the coefficients for the regression model 
shows results of testing the effect of each indicator of the independent variable 
on performance. The specific indicators of the variables are as defined in 
equation 2.1. Tests for linearity of the respective indicators were conducted in 
order to confirm that the data was derived from a population that relates with 
the variables of interest proportionately as recommended by Damon (2017). It 
is clear that the highest positive regression coefficient was equitable revenue 
(UB) from the National government, followed by Local Revenue (LR) while 
conditional/unconditional grants from various sources were not a significant 
predictor. In this model, output is produced from the inputs of equitable share, 
local revenues and conditional transfers. Table 10 shows that all the P-values 
were less than 0.05 at the 95% significance level except that of conditional 
grants. This led to the rejection of the null hypothesis and acceptance of the 
alternate hypotheses. On this score of achievements of the devolved system of 
governance, Kirira (2011) states that devolution has presented a major 
transformation of the country and undoubtedly reversed the system of 
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centralized control and authority established by the colonial powers. 
Additionally, a report by Mo Ibrahim Foundation, on Index of African 
Governance (2018) observed that Kenya recorded progress in governance 
alongside long term performance. The report noted that the country did 
remarkably well in sustainable economic opportunity score which measures 
the extent to which governments enable their citizens to pursue economic 
goals and give them opportunity to prosper. This result is supported by 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & McNab (2003), who held that though the 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth remains 
mixed and controversial, decentralisation has positive impacts on efficient 
allocation of resources, democratic governance and enhanced accountability. 
 
Limitations 
This paper acknowledges that one of the key limitations of being able 
to establish the effects of fiscal decentralisation on performance of County 
governments is the presence of other variables such as allocative efficiency, 
governance and politics. In addition, other exogenous factors such as 
population size, size of respective regions and their attendant 
poverty/wellbeing status also had a certain level of effect on the outcomes of 
performance of County governments. The so-called attribution challenge is 
further exacerbated by the inability to relate outcomes directly due to existence 
of a huge number of private and public players within the territorial context of 
County governments activities. 
 
Conclusions 
The specific objective of this paper was to assess the effect of fiscal 
decentralisation on the performance of subnational governments in Kenya. 
From the literature, it is noted that policy reforms and their impact on 
government performance can be broken down for analytical purposes into 
three broad perspectives. Firstly, is a focus on the changes taking place in the 
level of economic activities in terms of wages and prices of goods and services 
which increase incomes of small-scale farmers, laborers and traders as well as 
workers in the informal sector. Secondly is human development or 
improvements in the quality of life as reflected in their access to health, 
education, sanitation and higher life expectancy. The third perspective is 
spatial or inter-regional inequality that reflects the extent of redistributive 
justice or growth between deprived and economically wealthier areas; in terms 
of social inequality through redistribution of incomes. 
Fiscal Decentralisation has presented a major transformation package 
of the country and undoubtedly reversed the system of centralized control and 
authority established by the colonial powers to a more inclusive system, 
leaving the future looking bright. From the three indicators of fiscal 
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decentralisation, used in the study, the findings indicate that County 
governments (CGs) heavily depend on the National government (NG) for 
revenues to finance their expenditure functions. Their own sources of revenue 
is negligible compared to their receipts from the national government. 
With the coefficient of determination (r2) being observed as 27.43%, 
it can therefore be concluded that higher amounts of transfers from the 
National governments to the subnational governments will have a positive and 
significant influence on the performance of county governments in Kenya. 
The Commission on Revenue Allocation (2014) held that by allocating a 
constant amount of funds to various counties and giving them increased 
flexibility, the units are able to institute timely preparation of budgets and 
promote fiscal probity and responsibility, leading to enhanced performance. 
This conclusion supports the findings by Bodman (2008) who in an 
analysis of fiscal decentralisation and economic development in Spain found 
that decentralisation has a positive relationship for communities with a high 
degree of fiscal autonomy. 
It is expected that the inter-county differences in tax policies, 
expenditure priorities, accountability and human capacity at the local level are 
key determinants of cross county variations in performance of County 
governments. This is because needs are not homogenous over counties or even 
within regions of an individual county. It’s imperative for subnational 
governments to recognize the different needs of citizens and pay special 
attention to the poor and disadvantaged groups. This process is actually done 
through direct assessment of citizens’ needs followed by public participation 
to prioritize and engender ownership under hard budget constraints. 
Population size within counties also affects greatly the per capita expenditures 
as higher growth of population lowers per capita incomes because the 
available resources must be spread more thinly over the entire population 
(Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992). The paper recommends legal amendments 
to enforce a hard budget constraint and streamlining of local capacity taxation 
mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability to local residents in 
order to enhance local revenue collection and improve performance. County 
governments must be made to understand that they must work harder on 
raising local revenues and become more prudent in their budgeting and 
expenditure plans. They must also acknowledge the fact it does not help for 
the National government to continue transferring funds to them which comes 
from taxing others who also deserve goods and services by the taxes they pay. 
This is in view of the fact that despite the huge investments made by 
National government and devolution of huge resources to county 
governments, absorption and performance have been slowed down due to its 
bureaucratic nature, lack of adequate capacity, corruption and inadequate 
political will leading to systematic resource mis-allocation. The study 
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objective which was to assess the relationship between fiscal decentralisation 
and performance of County governments in Kenya is therefore achieved. 
 
Future research directions 
Future research can be focused on establishing the post transition 
relationships amongst the key variables. Other studies could focus on 
assessing the relationship of fiscal decentralisation for sampled number of 
county governments and not the whole population. Furthermore, scholars can 
conduct case studies of individual county governments that can examine the 
relationships between selected variables such as health, education, 
infrastructure among others. This may be necessary given that counties are 
highly heterogeneous and straddle very diverse climatic and physical 
conditions; and their geographical and population sizes also differ markedly. 
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